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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*
Nuon Chea is the most senior surviving member of the notorious Khmer Rouge regime
that reigned from 1975-1979 in Cambodia.1 In order to ensure that the victims of the Khmer
Rouge leadership’s reign of terror, and their families, receive justice and international judicial
acknowledgement of their horrific plight three decades ago, it is essential that the prosecution
prove Nuon Chea’s part in the tragedy. This memorandum addresses whether Nuon Chea can be
held accountable under the three categories of joint criminal enterprise liability and whether he
can be held accountable under the doctrines of direct and indirect command responsibility, both
as a military commander and as a civilian superior.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Nuon Chea may be held liable under joint criminal enterprise, category 1.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty under joint criminal enterprise, category 1
because he voluntarily participated in a common design to interrogate, torture, and kill, and he
intended that such violations result.2
2. Nuon Chea may be held liable under joint criminal enterprise, category 2.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty under joint criminal enterprise, category 2
because Tuol Sleng and other prisons around the country can be considered a form of a
* Original phrasing of issue: One of the likely defendants before the ECCC (Mr. Nuon Chea, Pol Pot’s chief
lieutenant) has been quoted as saying, “I have responsibility for what happened, not for the killing but for not being
able to protect my own people.” Analyze his potential criminal liability for failure to prevent and punish under the
doctrine of command responsibility.
1

Phil Rees, Brother Number Two Enjoys Retirement BBC NEWS (2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/
correspondent/1874949.stm (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Phil Rees, Brother Number Two] [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 77].

2

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the
Khmer Rouge, 62 (War Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, American University & Coalition for
International Justice, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85]; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 119-120 (Dec. 10, 1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 23].

1

concentration camp – it was a systematic way of interrogating, torturing, and killing the so-called
enemies of the Pol Pot regime.3 Nuon Chea actively participated in this system of repression,
which is especially demonstrated by his position of authority,4 and he intended the ill treatment
and killings of those taken to Tuol Sleng.
3. Nuon Chea may be held liable under joint criminal enterprise, category 3.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty under joint criminal enterprise, category 3
because he intended to contribute to a common criminal plan of implementing policies of
uniformity, expulsion, extermination, and general discrimination. 5 He took the chance that at
least one of his subordinate co-perpetrators would commit an international humanitarian law
(IHL) violation outside of the common plan. That they would commit extensive atrocities not
pursuant to direct orders was a natural and foreseeable risk.6
4. Nuon Chea may be held liable as both a military commander and as a civilian superior
under the doctrine of command responsibility.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty as a military commander under the command
responsibility theory of liability because he knew and had reason to know that atrocities were

3

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al. Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 320 (Nov. 2, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 29], as cited by WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 312 (Cambridge University Press 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 64]; Review Exclusive: Duch Implicates Living Khmer Rouge Leaders in Killings,
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999), http://www.feer.com/breaking_news/duch2.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2007) [hereinafter Review Exclusive: Duch Implicates] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 82].
4

Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 511 (Nov. 30, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 31].
5

Liai Duong, Racial Discrimination in the Cambodian Genocide, 4-5 (Genocide Studies Program, MacMillan
Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University, GSP Working Paper No. 34, 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 75].
6

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 83 (Feb. 28, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 30].

2

being committed at Tuol Sleng, often upon his direct orders.7 The tribunal should also find Nuon
Chea guilty as a civilian superior under the superior responsibility theory of liability because he
at least knew and consciously disregarded the information showing that torture, interrogations,
and killings were taking place.8 Since he held positions of both military and civilian authority,
Nuon Chea should be charged under both standards.9
a. Nuon Chea may be held liable under direct command responsibility.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty under direct command responsibility because
there is extensive evidence that he explicitly ordered interrogations, tortures, summary
executions, and purges within his own party, and against the former Lon Nol regime members,
intellectuals, Chams, Vietnamese, and Chinese.10
b. Nuon Chea may be held liable under indirect command responsibility.
The tribunal should find Nuon Chea guilty under indirect command responsibility
because there is conclusive evidence that he should have known of at least the atrocities being

7

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a)(i), Jul. 17, 1998 [hereinafter Rome Statute]
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11].
8

Id. at art. 28(b)(i).

9

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 53, 65 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85];
JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, Documenting the Crimes of Democratic Kampuchea, in BRINGING THE
KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS 253-254 (Jaya Ramji
& Beth Van Schaack, eds., The Edwin Mellen Press 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].
10

Nuon Chea Secretly Orders Duch to Kill People in Tuol Sleng Prison, 13 MONEAKSEKAR KHMER 3024 (2006),
http://www.krtrial.org/showarticle.php?language=english&action=shownews&art_id=1339&needback=1&PHPSES
SID=4684f42824e3113326b01a52bb6c7efa (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Nuon Chea Secretly Orders
Duch][reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 76]; BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79, 58, 101 (2d ed. Yale University Press 2002)
[hereinafter BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58]; Stephen Heder
& Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 52 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85]; Review Exclusive:
Duch Implicates, supra note 3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 82]; see generally Liai Duong, supra
note 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 75].
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committed in the East Zone and at Tuol Sleng.11 He was put on notice by the innumerable
documents sent to the various committees he belonged to, as well as addressed specifically to
him. That he did not bother to investigate and pursue violations of IHL that he was on notice of
does not relieve him of indirect command responsibility liability. 12
7. Nuon Chea’s possible defenses to charges brought against him will fail.
Nuon Chea may try to raise the defense of tu quoque and factual defenses to challenge
the elements of liability. He may challenge the evidence before the tribunal, and claim that the
use of force against the Cambodian people was warranted. Tu quoque fails, however, because it
has specifically been rejected as a legitimate defense because IHL imposes absolute obligations
on state and private actors, which are not based on the idea of reciprocity.13 Nuon Chea’s other
defenses fail because the evidence shows that not only did he directly order the IHL violations,
including interrogation, torture, and summary executions, but he also had reason to know that
such were taking place, as his name was on reports and at least one report was directly delivered
to him.14 Duch’s statements corroborate that Nuon Chea was in charge, that there was a
superior-subordinate relationship, and that Nuon Chea had effective control of Duch and others.
Any denial of knowledge is wholly implausible, as documentary evidence and interviews with
survivors and former leaders demonstrate that the leadership was fully aware of what occurred

11

See Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 51-65 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
85].

12

See id. at 58, 65.

13

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 515-520 (Jan. 14, 2000) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 28].

14

See generally Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 51-65 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 85].

4

beneath them.15
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Khmer Rouge
From 1975 to 1979, during the reign of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia was reformed into a
classless agrarian society where everyone was forced to agricultural labor to the point of
overwork, disease, and starvation.16 Pol Pot’s regime sought to return Cambodia back to Year
Zero, and in order to accomplish this, instituted policies eliminating both professional classes
and any kind of technology.17 One author has referred to the purges of the Pol Pot regime as
making “Stalin’s elimination of all imagined rivals seem like a civilized political process.”18
The atrocities began when the Khmer Rouge shot their way into the capital city of Phnom
Penh19 with the intent of ridding Cambodia of all those “‘thoroughly tainted by imperialism.’”20
This plan was formulated in February of 1975, and put into action on April 17, 1975.21 It was

15

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 332 (March 3, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 19], as cited in YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD
HOC TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 105 (Routledge 2004) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 65].
16

Phil Rees, Brother Number Two, supra note 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 77]; Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Cambodians Chart the Khmer Rouge Paper Trail, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE A01
(2001), http://www.genocidewatch.org/Cambodiandoccenter1.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 81].
17

‘Killing Fields’ Executioner Keen to Testify, CNN.COM (2001), http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/
southeast/08/08/cambodia.khmer/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 74] & Mann Bunyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense?, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581
(2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 52].

18

HENRY KAMM, CAMBODIA: REPORT FROM A STRICKEN LAND 131 (Arcade Publishing 1998) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 60].

19

Roger Normand, At the Khmer Rouge School: The Teachings of Chairman Pot, THE NATION, 198 (1990)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 83].

20

Id. at 200.

21

BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME, supra note 10, at 33 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58].
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the beginning of a “substantial destruction of a people by their own leaders.”22 This resulted
from the radical policies implemented by the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, including a blanket
ban on religion and any kind of religious observance, the forced communalization of people
(which brought about the destruction of family units), and the cultural destruction of Cambodia,
including the destruction of Buddhist pagodas, libraries, and statues.23 The Khmer Rouge
abolished both money and markets. Most importantly, they worked to create a unified national
race based on communist ideals.24
It is estimated that approximately 1.7 million people died as a direct and indirect result of
Khmer Rouge policies.25 The Khmer Rouge implemented policies targeting certain groups. Of
the Khmer national group, as well as those members of other minority groups, the Khmer Rouge
sought out and killed anyone with ties to the old Lon Nol regime – Khmer Rouge cadres would
either club these people to death or shoot them. They beat babies to death on trees. They killed
anyone wearing glasses, because they were considered to be “intellectuals,” and as such were a
considered a threat to their new “radical Maoist experiment.”26
The leadership particularly targeted minority groups, especially the Vietnamese, Chams,
and Chinese.27 In their efforts to attain national uniformity and economic equality, the Khmer

22

DAVID R. HAWK, International Human Rights Law and Democratic Kampuchea, in THE CAMBODIAN AGONY, 118
(David A. Ablin & Marlowe Hood, eds., M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1990) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 59].

23

Id. at 120-121.

24

Mann Bunyanunda, supra note 17, at 1581 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 52].

25

Id.; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, supra note 16 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 81].

26

William Shawcross, Persecutions on Political, Racial, or Religious Grounds, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT: THE
BOOK, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/persecutions-on.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 86].
27

While proving that the Khmer Rouge leadership had the specific intent to target protected groups under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 4] is outside the scope of this memorandum, it

6

Rouge established policies of imposing uniformity, expulsion, extermination, and general
discrimination, the effects of which manifested most strongly on minorities. Through “forced
Khmerization” the leadership made all minorities give up identifying cultural and religious
symbols, practices, and languages.28
B. Nuon Chea
Nuon Chea was half of “the Organization,” also known as “Angkar,” which consisted of
himself and Pol Pot.29 In other words, he and Pol Pot together formed the core leadership of the
Khmer Rouge. Known as “Brother Number Two,” Nuon Chea served as Pol Pot’s chief
lieutenant and was the Deputy General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
(CPK).30 He was responsible for state security, and has been implicated by Ieng Sary, another
Khmer Rouge leader, in knowing exactly what went on at Tuol Sleng (also called S-21), the
infamous concentration camp-like prison where prisoners were tortured and killed.31 It is
estimated that as many as 16,000 people were executed at this former high school.32
As Deputy Secretary, Nuon Chea had duties including responsibility for propaganda,
is important to note that racial discrimination did arise as a result of Khmer Rouge policies between 1975-1979, and
manifested within politics, culture, and economics. “Motive is irrelevant to whether racial discrimination (or
genocide) exists because even if the motive of a policy is not racialist, the predictable effects of a policy can be
racial… racial discrimination can be opportunistic or even inadvertent.” Liai Duong, supra note 5, at 3, 33
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 75].
28

Id. at 4-5.

29

BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME, supra note 10, at 33 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58].

30

Phil Rees, Brother Number Two, supra note 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 77]; Khmer Rouge
Leader Nuon Chea “Very Ill”, BANGKOK POST (2006), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC): The Official Website of
the Khmer Rough Trial Task Force, http://publicinternationallaw.org/warcrimeswatch/archives/wcpw_vol01issue14
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 73].
31

HENRY KAMM, supra note 18, at 141 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 60].

32

Phil Rees, Cambodia – Brother No. 2, FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT (2002), http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories
/s563078.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Phil Rees, Cambodia] [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 78].
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Party work, social welfare, culture, and formal education.33 He was the President of the
Cambodian People’s Representative Assembly,34 helped to oversee the national security police,
and from time to time served as the prime minister of the Democratic Kampuchea government.35
The Documentation Center has enormous amounts of evidence in the forms of
documents, reports, tortured confessions, and interviews with survivors, implicating Nuon Chea
both directly and indirectly in co-authoring and applying the murderous Khmer Rouge policies.36
The Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Youk Chhang, stated that the
documentary evidence is strongest against Nuon Chea and Duch.37 It appears that Nuon Chea
played a central role in formulating and promulgating CPK execution policies, especially via
orders to his subordinates.38 “Documentary evidence can prove that he exercised the highest
level of command authority during the DK regime; his de facto (and possibly de jure) authority
extended to almost every subordinate member of the CPK ranks.”39 He was, in essence, “in
direct command of the movement’s killing machine during its 1975-1979 reign of terror.”40

33

BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME, supra note 10, at 100 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58].

34

Id. at 326.

35

Samantha Brown, Reclusive But Free, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Leaders Wait for Trial, CURRENT AFFAIRS:
FINGER ON THE PULSE, http://www.fourelephants.com/current_affairs.php?sid=288 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 84].
36

See generally Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 51-65 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 85].

37

Duch was the head of Tuol Sleng. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, supra note 16 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 81].

38

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 52 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85].

39

JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, supra note 9, at 254 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].

40

Review Exclusive: Duch Implicates, supra note 3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 82].
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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Charges that may be brought against Nuon Chea
Nuon Chea may be charged under all three categories of joint criminal enterprise (JCE)
and under both direct and indirect command responsibility (CR), as both a civilian superior and
as military commander. These charges are not mutually exclusive41 – Nuon Chea can and should
be charged and convicted under both JCE and CR. The Prosecutor must take care to make both
charges apparent in the indictment, however.42 As for JCE, the indictment must also make clear
that “committed” does not necessarily mean that Nuon Chea personally or physically committed
the crimes alleged, but rather, contributed to their co-perpetration.43 Finally, where a concurrent
conviction under both direct individual responsibility (i.e. JCE) and CR are probable, then the
trial chamber should convict the accused under an individual responsibility theory of liability,
taking into account the accused’s superior position as an aggravating factor for sentencing.44
If Nuon Chea is charged with murder, it must be shown that the victims took no active
part in the hostilities.45 As the evidence demonstrates that many of the Khmer Rouge’s victims
did not take part in hostilities, aside from those military cadres that were killed during party

41

JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, supra note 9, at 254 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61];
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 210, 554-555 (May 21, 1999) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 24]; Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 745 (Feb. 20,
2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 33].
42

ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, 525 (Karim Khan & Rodney Dixon, eds., 2d ed. 2005)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 57].

43

Id. at 526, citing Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution
Application to Amend, (June 26, 2001) & Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision Varying Decision on Form of Further
Amended Indictment, (July 2, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 57].

44

Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 34 (Dec. 17, 2004) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 27].

45

Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 236 (Jan. 31, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 34].
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purges, their deaths constitute murder under article 3 of the ICTY Statute. To prove Nuon
Chea’s mens rea for murder, he must have known that his act or omission would probably, and
not possibly, cause death.46 If Nuon Chea is charged with crimes against humanity, then a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population must be proven.47 The attacks,
not Nuon Chea’s specific acts, must be widespread and systematic,48 although he must
knowingly take part.49
B. The conflict in Cambodia was an armed conflict such that international humanitarian
law is applicable.
Given the very low threshold requisite for a conflict to be characterized as an armed
conflict such that IHL will apply,50 it is apparent here that Khmer Rouge policies against certain
ethnic and religious groups, the new people, and intellectuals arose to the status of an armed
conflict. In Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission took the stand that
a confrontation between attackers and the Argentine armed forces, which lasted for a mere thirtysix hours, was an armed conflict.51 As an armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, as well as other rules relevant to internal hostilities, applied, 52 and the Khmer
Rouge therefore had a duty to follow such law/rules.

46

Id. at ¶¶ 235-236.

47

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 98 (July 29, 2004) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 20].

48

Id. at ¶ 101.

49

Id. at ¶ 126.

50

Lindsay Moir, Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 182, 189 (2003) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 49].

51

Id. citing Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Report No. 555/97, Case 11.137, Inter-Am C.H.R. 271, OEA
ser.L/VII.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 49].

52

Id.

10

International humanitarian law ‘does not require the existence of large scale and
generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which dissident armed
groups exercise control over parts of national territory.’ The Commission found the
confrontation at the La Tablada barracks to qualify as an armed conflict because it
involved a carefully planned, coordinated and executed armed attack against a
quintessential military objective – a military base, notwithstanding the small number of
attackers involved and the short time frame of the fighting.53
There were several incidents of rebellion throughout the duration of the Khmer Rouge’s
reign, especially by Chams, ethnic Khmer, and CPK mutinying as a result of the party purges.54
Many Chams in particular rebelled against the CPK leadership. One example of such a rebellion
was an instance where the Khmer Rouge tried to close a village mosque; subsequently, the
Chams resisted this effort and fought back, killing five Khmer Rouge soldiers.55 In response, the
Khmer Rouge massacred the Chams, took families away, and destroyed the entire village.56
Other examples of rebellions include the 1975 uprising of the Chams and the 1978 uprising of
ethnic Khmers in the Eastern Zone. Such rebellions against Khmer Rouge policies and practice
demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict such that the rules of IHL apply.57
Further, these rebellions satisfy the two requirements necessary to establish the existence
of an armed conflict of a non-international character: 1) that open hostilities between armed
forces exist, and 2) that situations exist where hostilities might break out between armed forces

53

Michael Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L (2004), citing Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Report No. 555/97, Case 11.137, Inter-Am
C.H.R. 271, OEA ser.L/VII.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶¶ 155-156 (1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 50].
54

Ben Kiernan, Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002, 34(4) CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 483, 486-487
(2002) [hereinafter Ben Kiernan, Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
67].
55

Liai Duong, supra note 5, at 15 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 75].

56

Id. at 16.

57

Ben Kiernan, Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, supra note 54, at 486 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 67].
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or armed resistance groups within a single state’s territory.58 Different rules apply based on
whether an armed conflict is international or internal in nature. However, many would call for a
change in this distinction, in order to apply the law of armed conflict to those situations that do
not fall neatly within these current distinctions.59 Most conflicts in modern times are not
specifically international or internal in character. More and more do not fall into neat categories,
as they are often between a state and a nonstate actor, or between insurgent groups, etc.60 “A
new law of armed conflict should recognize that when the same organization (state or nonstate)
is behind repeated and serious acts of politically motivated violence that are nonetheless
discontinuous in time and space, any party to the conflict may invoke the law of armed
conflict.”61 Such a definition would account for the atrocities that occurred under the Khmer
Rouge without a back bending analysis of whether the law of armed conflict is applicable to the
Cambodian conflict.
C. Joint Criminal Enterprise
Those persons that contribute to the commission of a JCE are subject to potential
individual criminal liability, because each person’s contribution is often crucial to carrying out
the crime in question.62 The accused’s knowledge of the actual perpetrator’s intent is not a

58

Alex Obote Odora, Prosecution of War Crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 10 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 43 (2001-2002) citing Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 248
(Jan. 27, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 39].
59

Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the
Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 755 (2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 54].

60

Id. at 755-756.

61

Id. at 756.

62

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 191 (July 15, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 35].
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necessary prerequisite to a finding of JCE liability.63 However, both the accused and the person
actually carrying out the crime must be shown to have had the same state of mind.64
The objective elements of JCE are that there must be a plurality of persons involved, a
common plan or purpose must exist, and the accused’s level of participation can range from
actually committing the crime to assisting in or contributing to its commission.65 The common
plan or purpose need not be formal, however,66 and may be express or implied.67
The accused’s contribution also need not be substantial.68 In some instances where it is
not clear whether the accused should be characterized as an aider or abettor, or as a participant in
a JCE, it is important to look at the element of time: the longer participation in the plan lasts, the
more likely the accused is a co-perpetrator in a JCE.69 Other factors to be considered include the
nature of the JCE, the persons involved, and how the accused participated in the JCE.70 In
essence, JCE’s usefulness lies in its broad scope of application because there is “no minimum
quantum of contribution an individual must make to a JCE.”71

63

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 309 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64].

64

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 63-69 (Nov. 29, 2002) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 36].

65

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 227 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

66

See Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 63-69 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
36].

67

Id.

68

Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, supra note 6, at ¶ 97 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30].

69

Id. at ¶ 88.

70

ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 42, at 526 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 57].
71

Allison Marston Danner, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Contemporary International Criminal Law, 98 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 186, 188 (2004) [hereinafter Allison Marston Danner, Joint Criminal Enterprise] [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 40].
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Category 1 JCE (JCE 1) involves cases where the accused was a co-perpetrator in the
crimes alleged. The requisite elements are that “(i) the accused must voluntarily participate in
one aspect of the common design… and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the
killing, must nevertheless intend this result.”72 There must be a shared intent to commit the
certain crime pursuant to the perpetrators’ common plan.73
Category 2 JCE (JCE 2) involves cases where there is a systemic form of repression
being perpetrated. Most often, it is “the existence of an organized criminal system, in particular
in the case of concentration and detention camps.”74 The requisite elements for JCE 2 are the
accused’s “active participation in the enforcement of a system of repression, [together with]… (i)
knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design
to ill-treat inmates.”75 What is important to note in JCE 2 cases is that both the physical act and
mental intent may be inferred from the accused’s position of authority.76
Finally, Category 3 JCE (JCE 3) involves those instances where an act occurs outside the
common criminal design, but the act, in itself, is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
common design.77 To establish liability, it must be shown that the accused had the intention to
contribute to a JCE, and that he/she knew that the crime that actually occurred might be
committed by one of the other members of the group, and so took that chance by continuing to

72

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 228 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

73

Id.

74

Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, supra note 6, at ¶ 82 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30].

75

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 203 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

76

Id.

77

See ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 42, at 512-513 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 57].
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participate in the JCE.78 The crime must be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
common plan.79
1. Modern Historical Development
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has detailed JCE
extensively.80 JCE was first looked at by the ICTY in Furundzija, where it discussed the trial of
those who ran the Dachau Concentration Camp, a case in which all involved were found guilty
of running the camp pursuant to a common plan.81 In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber found JCE
implicitly in the ICTY Statute based on a victim-centered ideology.82 Under article 7(1) of the
ICTY Statute, an accused is individually criminal responsible for participation in a JCE for the
crimes outlined in articles 2 through 5.83 Failing to hold those accountable that directly
participated but did not actually commit the enumerated crimes would go against the object and
purpose of the Statute.84
A similar line of reasoning also applies to article 6(1) of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statute.85 When interpreting article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, the

78

Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, supra note 6, at ¶ 83 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30].

79

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 204 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

80

Allison Marston Danner, Joint Criminal Enterprise, supra note 71, at 187 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at tab 40].

81

Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 211-213 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
23].

82

JCE is a way to find accountability for the crimes within ICTY’s jurisdiction . Allison Marston Danner, Joint
Criminal Enterprise, supra note 71, at 188 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 40].
83

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(1), 1993, U.N. S.C. Res. 827
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 12].

84

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶¶ 188-189 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

85

ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 42, at 511 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
tab 57]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(1), Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. S.C. Res. 955
[hereinafter ICTR Statute] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 13].
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jurisprudence of the ICTY ought to be relied on.86 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
has also employed JCE as a theory of liability,87 under article 6 of its Statute.88 Further, JCE has
been recognized as part of customary international law since at least 199289 because it is
encompassed within the theory of accomplice liability.90 The elements of JCE, however,
comprise a judge-made concept that was articulated in order to hold liable members of groups
where criminal intent of the individual members is difficult to prove.91
JCE has been incorporated into the Rome Statute of the newly formed International
Criminal Court (ICC). Individual criminal responsibility attaches when a person “contributes to
the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose.”92 JCE has also been used recently to try terrorists in US military
commissions, where the actus reus is alleged to be conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, and the
mens rea is willfully and knowingly participating in a JCE.93

86

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 311, citing Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana et al. ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR 9617-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 467-484 (Dec. 13, 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64].
87

Id. at 311.

88

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000) [hereinafter
SCSL Statute] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 14].

89

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 309 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64].

90

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 220 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].

91

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 309 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64], citing Allison
Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility,
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 102-112, 131-146 (2005) [hereinafter Allison
Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 41].
92

Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 25(3)(c) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11].

93

Allison Marston Danner, Joint Criminal Enterprise, supra note 71, at 189, citing U.S. v. Ibrahim Ahmed
Mahmoud al Qosi, Charge: Conspiracy ¶ 18 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Feb2004/d20040224A1Qosi.pdf & U.S. v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al Bahlul, Charge: Conspiracy ¶ 14
(Feb.24, 2004), available at http://www/defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224A1Bahlul.pdf [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 40].
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2. Applying Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability to Nuon Chea
a. Category 1
At a conference in the Western Zone in 1977, Nuon Chea noted that local traitors and
dangerous party members had begun to be systematically wiped out. He iterated the need to
conduct reviews of still more party members and officials. Following this conference, a security
chief and military commander were taken to Tuol Sleng.94 At a meeting of the Standing
Committee, at which Nuon Chea was present, it was decided to “continue the purge, pursue the
enemy and carry out normal tasks.”95 As the Standing Committee was considered a “supersecret committee,” Nuon Chea’s membership in and attendance at these meetings is significant in
implicating him as a co-author of execution policies.96 These statements and Nuon Chea’s
presence at meetings clearly show his substantial and voluntary contribution to Khmer Rouge
policy formulation, and hence satisfy the element that participation in a JCE requires some level
of participation in the common plan or design.97 Further, they demonstrate his intent that
policies concerning the purges continue.
As in Tadic, where the JCE 1 shared intent was “to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb
population, by committing inhumane acts,”98 here, it is evident that the CPK leadership wanted
to rid Cambodia of all those determined to be against, or possibly against, CPK policies. Such a

94

BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME, supra note 10, at 347 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58].

95

Id. at 351.

96

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 62 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85].

97

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 308, 311 (Aug. 2, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 25].

98

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, supra note 62, at ¶ 231 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35], as cited by
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 312 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64].
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stance also specifically targeted intellectuals, Khmer nationals,99 and various minority groups,
including the Cham, the Vietnamese, the Chinese,100 and the Buddhist monks.101 Additionally,
as in Milosevic, where it was observed that Milosevic’s intention was to remove certain
populations from Croatian land,102 here, Nuon Chea’s intention, like the rest of the Khmer Rouge
leadership, was to remove and/or “smash”103 certain designated groups of people, including the
Vietnamese, Chinese, Chams,104 Buddhist monks,105 and certain segments of the Khmer
population that opposed the Khmer Rouge leadership or were intellectuals.106
As a co-perpetrator, Nuon Chea is responsible not only for orders that he issued that
violated IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), but also for what occurred pursuant to
the policies he helped to formulate along with Pol Pot and Son Sen, other top Khmer Rouge
leaders.107 As there is much evidence against him as a co-author of and participator in
implementing these policies, including Duch’s specific claim that Nuon Chea played a

99

STEVE HEDER, Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Democratic Kampuchea Crimes:
Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective, in BRINGING THE KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING
MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS 384 (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack, eds., The Edwin Mellen
Press 2005) [hereinafter STEVE HEDER, Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders] [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 63].
100

See generally Liai Duong, supra note 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 75].

101

DAVID R. HAWK, supra note 22, at 130 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 59].

102

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, First Amended Indictment, ¶ 6 (Oct. 23, 2002) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 32].
103

“Smash” was a term used by the CPK leadership, that when applied to humans, meant to kill. One example of its
use is a prisoner list from Tuol Sleng that named “smashed” victims. JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG,
supra note 9, at 242 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].
104

See generally Liai Duong, supra note 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 75].

105

DAVID R. HAWK, supra note 22, at 130 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 59].

106

STEVE HEDER, Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders, supra note 99, at 384 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 63].

107

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 62 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85].
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significant role in planning the 1978 Eastern Zone purge,108 a formal common criminal plan is
expressly evident,109 and an analysis of whether a criminal plan can be inferred from the facts
need not be conducted.110
Nuon Chea actually directed the search for enemies within the party,111 demonstrating his
substantial contribution to the Khmer Rouge’s common plan to rid the country of all those
opposing them and their policies. Several confessions incriminate Nuon Chea in directing the
party purges; confessions were addressed to him and had notes from the interrogators asking him
for further direction as to what to do with their prisoners.112 However, what most clearly shows
Nuon Chea’s criminal intent in the JCE is his demand for proof that the executions were carried
out. Duch stated that Nuon Chea ordered him to bring to him photographs of those he had
ordered executed so that he could confirm that they were indeed dead.113 This evidence is all
demonstrative of Nuon Chea’s criminal intent shared with those carrying out the arrest and
execution policies and his contribution to implementing those policies, thus satisfying the
elements of JCE 1.
b. Category 2
During the period of 1975-1979, Cambodia was “one giant concentration camp.”114 The
United Nations Human Rights Commission’s Subcommission on the Prevention of
108
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Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities reported that the Khmer Rouge launched a
systematic program aimed at physically eliminating anyone who either belonged to the previous
Lon Nol regime or was of a higher social or educational class.115 The Subcommission referred to
this as “a systematic campaign of extermination.”116 Further, the Khmer Rouge’s concerted goal
was to end all religious, family, economic, and social values and reeducate the population,
particularly those who were forcibly deported from the cities and resettled in the rural
countryside.117
What followed next for the Cambodian people was a horrifying experience of forced
labor, where they were executed for the slightest complaints, denied adequate rest, food, and
medical care, and lived in a constant state of fear – fear of becoming one of the “numerous
persons… subjected to summary execution through cruel and barbaric methods including
disembowelment, pole axing, and beating to death, [or becoming one of the] prisoners…kept
bound and chained for long periods or tortured.”118 One surviving victim’s horrific story entails
being tortured at Tuol Sleng by being repeatedly subjected to electric shock and having his
toenails ripped out.119
As in Kvocka, where JCE 2 was found in a shared “intent to persecute and subjugate nonSerb detainees,”120 here, Nuon Chea clearly had a shared intent with other CPK leaders and those
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carrying out his orders, including Duch, to perpetrate a system of interrogation, torture, and
inevitable execution, due in part to cruel, ill-thought-out policies, and an overwhelming sense of
paranoia in the final years of the Khmer Rouge period.121 Duch has made statements that it was
leaders Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ta Mok who devised the policies of “organized killings.”122
Such policies can only be termed systematic. Further, Nuon Chea was at the forefront in
implementing these policies. In October 1975, Nuon Chea was given general responsibility for
the CPK work, which made him “the principal man for the killings.”123 Duch has stated that Pol
Pot left direction of Tuol Sleng to Nuon Chea, who then turned it into a military stockade where
the Military and Central Committees’ purge policies were carried out.124 Therefore, “the entire
operation at S-21 can be considered systematic and large-scale in nature.”125
As intent of the accused can be inferred from the accused’s knowledge of the continued
perpetration of ill-treatment at the camp, as well as the accused’s participation in the continuance
of the camp, and most importantly, the accused’s position of authority,126 it is evident that Nuon
Chea had the intent to continue a JCE 2. His various leadership roles, his issuance of orders to
his subordinates at Tuol Sleng, and his knowledge of the nature of the conditions at Tuol Sleng
and other prisons all culminate in proving his intent to continue a systemic form of ill-treatment.
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c. Category 3
The accused in Tadic was held accountable pursuant to JCE 3.127 There, the Appeals
Chamber found that the group’s intention was to forcibly remove non-Serbs from the Prijedor
region, and that the accused knew that killings frequently occurred during the forcible removal,
even though it was not part of the common plan. Nevertheless, he was found liable for
participating in “purging the areas in question of their non-Serb population by carrying out
‘inhuman acts’ pursuant to the common criminal purpose.”128 Other examples of JCE 3 include
the forced removal of an ethnic group from an area where some were killed, because it was
foreseeable that forcible removal would result in at least some deaths,129 and forcing civilians
from their homes by burning the homes, as it was foreseeable that some of the civilians would
perish as a result of this forcible eviction.130
This is similar to the forced evacuations of the cities committed on the orders of the
Khmer Rouge leadership, including Nuon Chea, which resulted in the removal of people from
the cities to the rural countryside.131 Also similar is the forced removal and eventual
extermination of the Vietnamese population.132 Additionally, the systematic attempt to rid
127
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Cambodia of anyone associated with the former Lon Nol regime is also analogous.133
The mens rea that must be shown under JCE 3 is that the accused had the intent to
participate in the common criminal design, and the accused must knowingly take the risk that
crimes not originally a part of the common criminal design, but which were a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the plan, might occur as a result of the implementation of the plan.134
By participating in the Khmer Rouge policies, by means of co-authoring, implementing, and
giving orders based thereon, Nuon Chea showed intent to participate in the common criminal
plan. By doing so, he also knowingly took the risk that his subordinates might carry out crimes
not enumerated in the common plan, such as discretionary killing deliberately left up to lowerranking cadres and not specifically ordered by the leadership. 135
All participants in the common plan will be held criminally responsible where the natural
and foreseeable consequence that occurs was predictable, and “the accused was either reckless or
indifferent to that risk.”136 Where the Khmer Rouge leadership’s orders were vague or provided
a wide degree of discretion to those lower-ranking leaders or cadres that carried out orders
pursuant to proffered guidelines,137 criminal responsibility may nonetheless be imputed to the
leadership, including Nuon Chea, because discretionary and excessive killing by those lowerranking was a predictable consequence. Also, the leadership may not escape liability by
providing vague orders, because issuing such vague guidelines shows that the leadership was
133
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both reckless and indifferent to how their promulgated policies were actually carried out.
Therefore, Nuon Chea and the rest of the leadership took the risk that their subordinates would
carry the Khmer Rouge policies further than was perhaps intended.
D. Command Responsibility
The doctrine of CR is predicated on the duty of commanders to control their
subordinates.138 Commanders and civilian superiors alike may be held individually criminally
responsible for their subordinates’ violations of IHL either committed pursuant to their orders or
not, in both international and non-international armed conflicts.139 The substantive elements of
CR include the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, knowledge that crimes had been
or were about to be committed (the general standard being knew or had reason to know), and
failure to prevent the commission of the crimes(s) or punish those subordinates that are
responsible.140 Causality need not be established, as it is not an element of the doctrine.141
CR is a form of liability based on the commander’s power to control his subordinates.
He/she has a duty to prevent and punish crimes by his/her subordinates.142 In order to effect
his/her duty, a superior-subordinate relationship and the commander’s effective control over
his/her subordinates must be shown. This includes the commander’s material ability to prevent
subordinates from committing IHL violations, and the material ability to punish the perpetrators
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thereof.143 Showing a commander’s effective control of his/her subordinates is more a matter of
evidence than a matter of substantive law.144
In addition, a superior’s position per se is of particular importance in determining
relevant knowledge of subordinates’ crimes.145 In order to determine a commander’s relevant
knowledge in regard to the acts of his subordinates, a tribunal may take the following factors into
account:
the number, type, and scope of illegal acts; the time during which they occurred; the
number and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical
location of the acts; their widespread occurrence; the tactical tempo of operations; the
modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved and the location of
the commander at that time.146
The geographical location of the subordinates, and whether they are direct or indirect
subordinates, does not limit the application of CR. A commander can be held liable even for
those subordinates that are just temporarily under his/her control.147
The issues to be determined in applying CR include “whether there is a duty of care or
duty to control, whether the duty was deliberately failed or culpably or willfully disregarded in
spite of knowledge, and whether serious consequences have resulted, or remained unpunished,
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because of the breach.”148 Actual knowledge of a commander can be established not only by
direct evidence, but by circumstantial evidence as well.149 Whether a commander “had reason to
know”150 of a subordinate’s IHL violation(s) is interpreted as “had information enabling them to
conclude,” as set forth in Additional Protocol I.151
What is demonstrative of CR as a commander’s form of participation in a subordinate’s
wrongdoing is that in most of the cases where the accused has been convicted pursuant to the CR
doctrine, the accused was also convicted based on being a principal perpetrator or accomplice.152
This is because in most of these cases, the commander actually knew of his subordinates’ acts,
and the prosecutor did not need to prove that the commander had reason to know.153 By virtue of
holding a command position, a commander assumes ultimate responsibility for what his/her
subordinates do, because only he/she is in the best position to educate and protect against
violations of IHL.154 The only thing standing in the way of chaos and destruction and the
commission of gross atrocities by uneducated, uncontrolled subordinates is a commander.
Society thus places its utmost faith and trust in him/her and is entitled to expect protection in
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return.155
1. Modern Historical Development
CR has been recognized throughout the 20th century,156 and the customary international
law and jurisprudence that developed throughout this time period was first formally codified in
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.157 In Hadzihasanovic, the Appeals Chamber
unanimously found that CR applies in non-international armed conflicts.158 In so finding, the
Chamber relied on customary international law as codified by the ICTY Statute, namely, that
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state practice and opinio juris endorsed the view that CR applies regardless of the nature of the
conflict.159
There are two different types of CR.160 Indirect CR has been codified in the ICTY, the
ICTR, and the SCSL Statutes as holding a commander liable for acts of his/her subordinates
where that commander knew or had reason to know that they had committed or were about to
commit acts contrary to IHL and failed to prevent their commission or punish the perpetrators
thereof.161 Indirect CR is characterized by omission(s) of the commander, by means of not
taking the necessary steps to prevent or punish his/her subordinates’ unlawful acts.162
As the Rwandan conflict was of an internal nature, it presents a good basis for
prosecuting the atrocities that occurred in Cambodia. ICTR case law demonstrates that IHL
applies regardless of whether a conflict is international or non-international in character.
Further, the ICTY has expressly stated that CR specifically applies regardless of whether it is an
international or internal armed conflict in Limaj.163
Direct CR is codified in article 7(1) and 6(1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes,
respectively. The doctrine fits into the same category as JCE because of the commander’s direct
participation in IHL violations by means of giving illegal orders, or helping to plan and instigate
the crimes of his/her subordinates.164 Essentially, direct CR occurs where the superior commits a
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positive act.165 Where direct CR is at issue, however, the prosecutor will often treat the case as
one of complicity or co-perpetration.166
The most recent codification of CR, which further demonstrates its status as part of
customary international law,167 is article 28 of the Rome Statute, which provides that:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly
over such forces, where: (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing
to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and (ii) That military commander or person failed to
take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a),
a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; (ii)
The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and
control of the superior; and (iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.168
Thus, by its distinction between (a) military “commander” and (b) “superior”, the Rome Statute
lays the most solid distinction between the slightly varied standards of knowledge attributable to
a commander based on whether he/she is acting in a military or civilian superior capacity.
Of particular importance to the victims of the Khmer Rouge is proving that genocide was
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in fact committed. This is because accountability for the crimes that occurred between 1975 and
1979 is a necessity for both the Cambodian people and the international community. By
addressing the atrocities, the tribunal will ensure that victims’ wounds are healed, that respect for
human rights is fully established as an international norm, and that the Khmer Rouge is
discredited, as well as other groups/institutions like it.169 Accountability based on genocide will
help to deter others and thus prevent future genocides.170
Evidence demonstrating the likelihood of genocide includes more than 400 bone-covered
killing fields as well as more than 20,000 mass graves around the country.171 Proving genocide
is a difficult task, however, given the strictures of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It requires that the perpetrator(s) have the specific intent
to destroy in whole or in part the members of a certain protected group or groups.172 Whether
Nuon Chea had that specific intent will be discussed below.173 But, it is important to note that
the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has regarded CR to extend to the crime of genocide.174
Where the accused is being tried under the doctrine of CR, “the mens rea required for superiors
to be held responsible for genocide pursuant to Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute is that the
superiors knew or had reason to know that their subordinates (1) were about to commit or had

169

Jason S. Abrams & Steven R. Ratner, Striving for Justice: Accountability and the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge,
276 (United States Department of State under the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, 1995) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 72].
170

Id.

171

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, supra note 16 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 81].

172

Genocide Convention, supra note 27, at art. II, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 4].

173

At note 196 and accompanying text.

174

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 320 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 64].

30

committed genocide and (2) that the subordinates possessed the requisite specific intent.”175
The charge of CR was also laid out in the accusation document against Saddam Hussein,
which relied on the Iraqi High Tribunal Law number 10 of 2005. Saddam would not be relieved
of individual criminal responsibility for acts committed by his subordinates if he knew or had
reason to know that such IHL violations were being carried out or were about to be carried out,
and he failed to prevent or punish them accordingly.176
2. Applying Command Responsibility to Nuon Chea
The first step in proving Nuon Chea’s guilt under CR for the atrocities that occurred
during the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia is to show that there was a superior-subordinate
relationship, and that he had either de jure or de facto control over his subordinates.177 In order
to determine this, customary international law indicates that besides looking at an accused’s de
jure control, one must assess “his ability, as demonstrated by his duties and competence, to
exercise control.”178 This is not a difficult evidentiary task, given the mountains of information
demonstrating that Nuon Chea was clearly in de jure command, as well as having de facto
control over his subordinates.179 His position as Deputy Secretary of the Central Committee, his
membership in the Standing Committee, and his membership in the Military Committee
demonstrate Nuon Chea’s significant de jure authority. The Central Committee and Standing
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Committee were the bodies most responsible for formulating CPK policy.180 Specifically, de
jure authority rested with the Party Secretary (Pol Pot) and the Deputy Secretary (Nuon Chea)
jointly, and they together issued party directives and presided over meetings of the Central
Committee. Both Duch and Ieng Sary, who also played significant roles during the Khmer
Rouge regime, have substantiated Pol Pot and Nuon Chea’s roles as the leading officials of the
entire regime.181
a. Military vs. Civilian Command Responsibility
Encompassed within the doctrine of CR is the idea that liability extends to those superiors
that are not part of a military chain of command. While the doctrine formerly extended only to
military commanders, it is now apparent that civilians are covered by the doctrine.182 Political
and bureaucratic superiors may be held accountable under the doctrine.183 The International Law
Commission stated that a civilian is considered a superior if that civilian exercises control over
subordinates similar to a military commander.184 Further, if a civilian has de jure or de facto
control over subordinates, in that he/she has the ability to issue orders and punish violations, then
a civilian can be characterized as a superior under article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.185
According to article 28 of the Rome Statute, there is a distinction between the mens rea
requirement for a military commander and the mens rea requirement for a civilian superior.
Article 28(a)(i) provides “That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
180
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circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes…” whereas under article 28(b)(i) a civilian superior “either knew, or
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were
committing or about to commit such crimes.” While there is as of yet no case law from the ICC
interpreting this provision, using canons of statutory construction, its plain meaning is evident.
A military commander is held to a higher standard than his/her civilian counterpart. It is
essentially the difference between criminal negligence and willful blindness, respectively.186
Based on the evidence gathered as to Nuon Chea’s position within the Khmer Rouge
hierarchy, it is clear that he may be tried under a civilian superior mode of responsibility, as he
was Deputy Secretary of the CPK187 and President of the National Assembly.

As president of

the National Assembly, Nuon Chea was in charge of a vast number of civilian CPK officials.188
He may also be tried under a military commander form of liability, given that he was Deputy of
the military committee of the Standing Committee, along with Ta Mok,189 was in charge of
security, and issued direct orders to Duch, who was in charge of the interrogations, tortures, and
killings at Tuol Sleng.190 As a member of the military committee, Nuon Chea had daily control
over the Khmer Rouge armed forces.191 Therefore, Nuon Chea should be charged under both
military and civilian CR.

186

See YUSUF AKSAR, supra note 15, at 104 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 65].

187

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 53 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85].

188

JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, supra note 9, at 254 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].

189

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 65 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85];
JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, supra note 9, at 254 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].

190

Stephen Heder & Brian D. Tittemore, supra note 2, at 64 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 85].

191

JOHN D. CIORCIARI WITH YOUK CHHANG, supra note 9, at 253 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 61].

33

b. Direct Command Responsibility
In an interview with Professor/Historian Ben Kiernan, mid-level CPK secretary Chea Sim
intimated that Nuon Chea gave explicit orders to kill in a speech Chea Sim recalled:
in order to achieve the construction of socialism progressively and advance all together in
the set period, we must take care to carefully screen internal agents… in the party, in the
armed forces, in the various organizations and ministries, in the government, and among
the masses of the people. We have to carefully screen them, Nuon Chea said. He
mentioned ‘the line of carefully screening internal agents to improve and purify, in order
to implement the line of building socialism…’ This was a very important order to kill.
Their careful screening was to take all measures so that people were pure… The line laid
down must be followed at all costs…If people could not do it, they would be taken away
and killed… The words ‘carefully screen’ were the killing principle.192
In another interview, Heng Samrin, who studied military affairs under Son Sen, noted that
between Nuon Chea and Pol Pot, Nuon Chea did most of the talking. It was Nuon Chea who
explained the Organization’s party policies and how they were to be carried out, although Nuon
Chea and Pol Pot’s views were the same, and the two were always together.193 But Chea Sim
noted some key differences between Nuon Chea and Pol Pot: “Nuon Chea’s behavior was
somewhat coarse, different from Pol Pot’s…. People always say that Nuon Chea is somewhat
cruel. His behavior is stronger.”194 Heng Samrin added that Nuon Chea once said that “We
cannot allow any Vietnamese minority [in Cambodia].”195
At a stadium gathering for a political course in Phnom Penh at the end of 1975, Nuon
Chea declared that two universities now existed in Cambodia as a result of their policies, one
teaching productive labor, and another promoting “the fight against the Vietnamese enemy.”196
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It is clear from these accounts that there was indeed a specific genocidal intent on Nuon Chea’s
part to rid Cambodia of the Vietnamese, specifically because they were Vietnamese.
Duch, who has stated that Nuon Chea and Pol Pot coerced him into becoming chief of
Tuol Sleng, also stated that Nuon Chea, among other leaders, “cheated” him into killing.197 In a
key interview, Duch confessed that in:
‘the last days before the Vietnamese came I personally killed the remaining prisoners [at
Tuol Sleng] … I was called by Nuon Chea to his office and he ordered me to kill all the
remaining prisoners. I asked Nuon Chea to allow me to keep one Vietnamese prisoner
alive to use for propaganda on the radio and he replied, “Kill them all. We can always
get more and more.”’198
That Nuon Chea ordered Duch to commit various atrocities, including killing 14,000 people at
Tuol Sleng, has been corroborated.199 Additionally, Duch kept handwritten logs of what
occurred at Tuol Sleng during his time there.200 He asserts that, pursuant to Nuon Chea’s orders,
Westerners were held at Tuol Sleng and tortured using electric shocks. After their deaths, Nuon
Chea wanted their bodies burned so that no bones would be left.201
What all of this documentary evidence indicates is that there was a superior-subordinate
relationship between Nuon Chea and lower leaders/cadres, including Duch. Effective control is
demonstrated by evidence showing that Nuon Chea’s affirmative orders to subordinates were
carried out. His having given orders to subordinates who were under his effective control to
arrest and execute certain people demonstrates Nuon Chea’s knowledge that IHL violations were
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being carried out. Giving orders amounts to a positive act.202 Further, having ordered these acts,
Nuon Chea both failed to prevent and failed to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Duch has stated that Nuon Chea “ordered 300 [Khmer Rouge] soldiers arrested. He
called to meet me and said, ‘Don’t bother to interrogate them –just kill them.’ And I did.”203
Nuon Chea’s ability to order and control his subordinates is clearly demonstrated by one Tuol
Sleng interrogator’s notebook that details that a prisoner was detained on Nuon Chea’s
command. Other documents asking for authorization or for further instructions were addressed
to the Standing Committee, which Nuon Chea belonged to,204 which clearly put Nuon Chea on
notice of what was being asked for or authorized. As the prosecution need only prove that
information was provided to Nuon Chea, and not that he actually was familiar with the
information available to him,205 the prosecution can clearly meet the requirement of showing that
Nuon Chea either knew of the atrocities that subordinates committed pursuant to his orders or
should have known. He committed a positive act206 of giving illegal orders that were carried out
by subordinates under his effective command and control.207
Further, as in the German High Command case at Nuremberg, if the prosecutor can show
that acts are directly traceable to the highest in command, that commander is liable and
criminality attaches to him or her, as opposed to attaching to everyone in the chain of the
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command.208 Here, there is substantial evidence that can be directly traced back to Nuon Chea as
the highest in command. For example, Duch has identified Nuon Chea as one of the main
decision-makers in the 1978 purge of the East Zone,209 as well as other purges. Nuon Chea was
instrumental for Pol Pot in carrying out CPK work in the form of the many arrests of CPK
members in all of the zones. Nuon Chea also directly ordered Duch and Son Sen to carry out
executions of certain people, including Party leaders. Some of the orders to kill certain people
and groups were given to Duch by Nuon Chea in writing. Duch has made it clear that he was
Nuon Chea’s “waterboy” in this respect.210 Nuon Chea insisted on seeing photographs of the
dead bodies of those he ordered killed as well, in order for him to confirm that they were indeed
executed pursuant to his orders and to assure compliance with his orders. In one instance, Nuon
Chea ordered Duch “to exhume the body of Von Vet [a member of the Standing Committee]
from the earth to take a picture of him dead because Nuon Chea wanted proof he was killed.”211
Obviously, Nuon Chea “‘was the principal man for the killings. Pol Pot was [only] interested in
military strategy.’”212
c. Indirect Command Responsibility
Even if the evidence and testimony should fail to prove Nuon Chea’s liability under a
JCE theory or Direct CR, the evidence surely does not fail in proving indirect CR. As will be
discussed below, the evidence clearly and explicitly establishes Nuon Chea’s duty to investigate
and prevent future atrocities and punish past atrocities that had occurred throughout the zones,
208
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and particularly at prisons like Tuol Sleng.213 As in Blaskic, where the commander was found to
have reason to know that crimes were about to be or had been committed because of his
“particular position of command and the circumstances prevailing at the time,”214 Nuon Chea
should be held liable for the same reasons. It is evident that Nuon Chea’s leadership positions
within the party contributed to his effective control over the lower ranking actual perpetrators of
the torture and executions.215
On appeal, the Chambers found that the accused had effective control of his subordinates
because he had the material ability to report his subordinates’ acts to his superiors, but did not do
so, which would have fulfilled his duty to punish the perpetrators.216 This duty to punish arises
based on article 87(1) and is also inferable from article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I.217
Further, the Appeals Chamber rejected the accused’s contention that he was being held to a strict
form of CR liability. Rather, the Appeals Chamber pointed out that the Trial Chamber had
properly regarded the accused’s de facto position as a per se indication of the accused’s
knowledge that his subordinates were committing crimes.218 It was therefore reasonable to infer
that the accused knew of the conditions at particular detention centers,219 which the Appeals
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Chamber held him liable for under CR.220 Additionally, the dissent recognized that the person
giving orders need not be the sole decision-maker, as it is not an element of CR. He/she may act
in concert with others, at different ranks in the chain of command, when exercising de jure or de
facto authority and issuing orders.221
Perhaps the clearest cut illustration of indirect CR is the case of General Strugar, before
the ICTY.222 There, Strugar, the accused, was held responsible for an attack on the Old Town of
Dubrovnik, committed by his subordinates, but not pursuant to his orders. Although Strugar’s
explicit warnings to not attack the Old Town, these orders were ignored and Dubrovnik was
indeed attacked. No action was ever taken against those responsible.223 What triggered indirect
CR under article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute here was that red flags were raised when Strugar
learned of a protest by the European Commission Monitoring Mission regarding the attack on the
Old Town,224 which in turn gave rise to Strugar’s duty investigate the situation and prevent
further illegal action by his subordinates.225 Strugar’s indirect CR liability was further confirmed
by his failure to punish his subordinates for such blatant violations of IHL.226
As in Strugar, Nuon Chea was clearly on notice that his subordinates were committing
systematic and widespread atrocities throughout the various zones. The chain of command
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ensured that all relevant information regarding implementation of party policy got to the Party
Center. Nuon Chea’s name was copied on many of the documents sent to Pol Pot,227 and there is
even evidence that at least one document was handed to him personally.228 There is conclusive
evidence that he should have known of the atrocities being committed in the East Zone and at
Tuol Sleng.229 In his confessions, Duch has implicated Nuon Chea in a great deal of
wrongdoing. He states that Nuon Chea personally ordered him to carry out interrogations,
torture, and killings,230 and in some cases demanded proof from Duch that certain people had
died, by means of photographs of the dead bodies. In one extraordinary case, Nuon Chea
demanded Duch exhume a body, to absolutely ensure that this “no-good element” was indeed
dead.231
Thus, the available evidence demonstrates that in many instances, Nuon Chea was not
only on notice of his subordinates’ illegal activities, but in some cases had actual knowledge, and
in fact ordered various atrocities to be carried out.232 Further, Duch has stated that everyone in
the CPK knew that anyone arrested would be and had to be killed. Knowledge of the killings
can therefore be imputed to Nuon Chea.233 His liability is even more clear cut than General
Strugar’s, given that Strugar was convicted based on a one-time offense for failing to investigate
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and punish accordingly the actions of his subordinates,234 whereas Nuon Chea was aware of and
indeed helped author the policy being continuously implemented by his subordinates.235 The
scale on which the atrocities occurred under Nuon Chea was far greater than under General
Strugar, rendering Nuon Chea’s liability that much clearer.
Further, as in Pohl, where the accused was held responsible for the mistreatment of
concentration camp prisoners because he had the ability to influence and control what was
occurring at the camp (de facto control) and because of his position (de jure control),236 here,
Nuon Chea should likewise be held accountable because he had the ability to influence and
control what happened not only at Tuol Sleng, but at other prisons around the country, given
both his ability to influence and control his subordinates (de facto), and his formal status (de
jure) within the CPK hierarchy.237
As the duty to prevent atrocities and punish those subordinates perpetrating them arose in
Nuon Chea’s position, the element of failure to carry out these duties must be examined.
Significantly, there has been no evidence found, to date, showing that Nuon Chea (or any other
CPK leaders, for that matter) took steps to prevent the commission of atrocities, or punish the
perpetrators thereof.238 Nuon Chea meets the mens rea requirement of knowledge, in that the
entire CPK leadership was fully aware that those arrested were made to confess and then
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summarily executed.239 Given that some memos were sent directly to Nuon Chea, with notes
written by jail officials detailing specific instances of torture,240 it is improbable that Nuon Chea
can establish he was without any knowledge of what was occurring. He had a clear duty to act
and to protect the Cambodian people.
E. Nuon Chea’s Possible Defenses Fail
“‘I have never stayed awake at night or shed any tears… I want to be clean, I want to
show my people that I am a good man.’”241 Nuon Chea feels no responsibility, let alone
remorse, for the system of conformation, torture, and mass murder beneath him and Pol Pot.
1. Tu Quoque
Tu quoque is based on the idea that because the nationals of the prosecuting state
committed crimes similar to those committed by the accused, the prosecutors may not hold the
accused accountable and be free from prosecution themselves.242 Nuon Chea argues that Henry
Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, was more guilty of killing than he, as in 1970,
Kissinger helped to orchestrate a bombing that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in order
to establish a Cambodian regime friendly to the US.243 In this sense, he puts forth the argument
that, as at Nuremberg, a Khmer Rouge tribunal would be no more than a form of “victor’s
justice.”
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Nuon Chea’s reasoning, whatever truth there may be in such an argument, is nonetheless
faulty. We are far ahead of where we were in terms of an international system of criminal justice
and working rules and laws. Nuremberg was the linchpin. While what may have developed
since Nuremberg may be the result of “victor’s justice,” it has nevertheless been accepted by the
so-called conquered, as is here demonstrated by Cambodia’s signature to and ratification of
numerous international instruments establishing treaty law governing international criminals and
individual responsibility and the laws of war.244 This being the case, Nuon Chea cannot claim
that such rules and laws are inapplicable to him and other Khmer Rouge leaders. Even more
compelling is the fact that the principle of tu quoque has been expressly rejected as a defense to
breaches of IHL by the ICTY.245 This is because IHL is based on the imposition of absolute
obligations on parties, and these obligations are not conditioned on another party’s failure to
exercise them.246 Moreover, it is a fact that is extrinsic to the charges brought.247 Nuon Chea
may not, therefore, point to whatever role the US, and Henry Kissinger in particular, played in
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Cambodia to exempt himself from liability for his wrongdoing.
2. Factual Defense – Lack of Knowledge
Nuon Chea maintains that there was not a genocide under his and Pol Pot’s leadership,
and that he is completely innocent of any wrongdoing,248 as the leaders “never guided or
ordered” killings.249 He claims hat he was not involved in the mass murder – that “‘enemies’
orchestrated from outside were behind the genocide.”250 What is more, he asserts that he was
“personally unaware of the mass killings until after his defection to the government” in 1996 and
that he and Pol Pot were unaware of the existence of Tuol Sleng.251 He seems to genuinely
believe that what he and Pol Pot and the other leaders did was for the betterment of the
Cambodian people; that the goals of the CPK were altruistic in nature. After all, he argues,
“‘Why should we have killed our own people? I do not see a reason…We wanted a clean,
illuminating and peaceful regime.’”252
He will argue that the deaths were a byproduct of the social transformation, that they
were mere casualties and unintended.253 This “ignorance of the holocaust,”254 is wholly
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incredible, as there is overwhelming evidence of Nuon Chea’s knowledge to the contrary.255
Further, even if it could be proven that Nuon Chea absolutely lacked knowledge of the crimes
committed by his subordinates, “where the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in
the discharge of his duties,”256 that commander will be imputed with knowledge based on having
reason to know of the atrocities committed.257 Here, Nuon Chea gave express orders to torture
and kill, contributed significantly to Khmer Rouge policy-making, and was on notice of crimes
committed, as is shown by his name on confessions and questions for further instruction in
carrying out the policies of torture and executions.258
3. Factual Defense – Lack of De Jure or De Facto Authority
Contrary to the statements of Duch, Nuon Chea asserts that he had no power to issue
orders or make decisions, and was merely in charge of education, ideology, and the National
Assembly. Rather, he has urged, it was Pol Pot and Son Sen who gave orders and made
decisions.259 It remains to be seen, however, what Duch’s motives are for providing statements
regarding party policy and hierarchy. More likely than Duch’s ill intentions for providing such
statements are that Nuon Chea, among others, is not providing the truth. Documentary evidence
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tends to corroborate Duch’s statements far more strongly than Nuon Chea’s statements.260 Even
if it is shown that Pol Pot and Son Sen were also involved in giving orders and making decisions,
more than one superior may be held accountable for IHL violations of subordinates.261
4. Evidentiary Challenges
Another argument that Nuon Chea may raise is that most of the hard evidence implicating
him were documents sent to him, not documents sent by him.262 He may therefore try and argue
that he never saw these documents; that just because his name was on them or that he was copied
on them does not prove that he actually saw the documents. However, given his role at the top
of the CPK hierarchy, and the kind of control that he and Pol Pot wielded, this is not a plausible
defense. Failing that, he may argue that interpretations of the code words in the documents
cannot be proven or corroborated and are too ambiguous to make a basis for conviction.263
Nuon Chea has also stated that any evidence compiled against him has been intentionally
manipulated,264 and that the potential unreliability of ex post facto testimony by lower-ranking
local cadres who may not have interpreted orders correctly or had a faulty recollection is not
enough of a basis to indict and convict him.265 This is not a workable defense, however, because
under JCE 3, the fact that lower-ranking cadres misinterpreted or interpreted orders too broadly
does not relieve a commander of liability. Where it can be shown that crimes committed based
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on this were a natural and foreseeable consequence, it will be presumed that the accused took
this chance by continuing his/her participation in effectuating these policies.266
5. Challenge Command Responsibility Element of Effective Control
Nuon Chea may try to challenge the effective control prong under CR. He asserts that
the mass murder committed was by enemies from within whom he could not control.267 This is
not an effective defense. It is a commander’s duty to establish and maintain effective control.
Further, it is abundantly clear that Nuon Chea did have effective control, as is evidenced by the
way he controlled Duch, and in so doing, controlled the atrocities that occurred at Tuol Sleng.
Any assertion that a formal top-down approach to finding accountability would be ill suited to
capture what truly occurred during the Pol Pot era268 is flawed. First, it assumes that those
occupying the middle and lower-ranking echelons would or could be subject to prosecution; a
possibility that has essentially been dismissed in coming to a compromise to go ahead with a
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, because the once-lower-ranking echelons now occupy positions of
authority in the current Cambodian government.269 Second, it fails to take account of
commanders’ duty to prevent and punish atrocities of which they are clearly on notice of, as
Nuon Chea certainly was.
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6. Legitimacy of Force
Finally, Nuon Chea may even liken the situation to that of the Canadian Airborne
Regiment’s experience in Somalia,270 i.e. that the growing frustration and despair amongst the
Khmer Rouge leadership that their idealistic system was not working out as planned led to
paranoia and extreme measures to try and keep alive and carry out their ideals. There are
notebooks evidencing the Khmer Rouge leaders’ paranoia that CIA spies, church workers, and
other enemies were infiltrating the Khmer ranks.271 This, however, was not considered a defense
during the trials of some of the officers involved in the Canadian/Somali situation, and further,
the Canadian government went so far as to disband the regiment, demonstrating that even
mistakes in the midst of frustration and desperation are no excuse for violating the laws and
customs of war.272
IV. CONCLUSION
Nuon Chea should be found guilty of violations of IHL based on either the JCE theory of
liability or under the doctrine of CR. Under JCE 1, it is apparent from the evidence that a
common purpose existed in which the leaders of the Khmer Rouge all jointly participated. Even
though Nuon Chea did not directly commit the atrocities, his role in voluntarily participating in
and contributing significantly to the policy formulation regarding the atrocities, and his intent
that that policy be carried out pursuant to his orders, establishes his guilt under JCE 1.273
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Under JCE 2, it is also apparent from the evidence that Nuon Chea perpetrated a system
of interrogation, torture, and killings in conjunction with other Khmer Rouge leaders. His high
rank and leadership especially demonstrate this – his ordering the atrocities, and being asked by
subordinates for further direction, shows his participation in and knowledge of the system.274
Under JCE 3, the prosecution can establish Nuon Chea’s intent to contribute to the common
criminal plan. He took the chance that at least one of the co-perpetrators would commit an IHL
violation outside of the common plan of implementing policies of uniformity, expulsion,
extermination, and general discrimination.275 That lower-ranking cadres would commit
extensive atrocities not pursuant to direct orders was a natural and foreseeable risk.
Further, even if each element of all three categories of JCE cannot be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, Nuon Chea should still be held accountable for the atrocities he took part in
under the doctrine of CR. In both his civilian and military roles, as Deputy General Secretary of
the CPK and as a member of the military committee and Pol Pot’s Chief Lieutenant
respectively,276 he satisfies the requisite elements. Not only is there conclusive evidence that
Nuon Chea should have known of the atrocities being committed in the East Zone and at Tuol
Sleng, therefore implicating him under indirect CR, there is even evidence that it was Nuon Chea
himself who ordered the interrogations, tortures, killings, summary executions, and purges
within his own party,277 which establishes his liability under direct CR. As Brother Number
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Two, he was Pol Pot’s mouthpiece, and some argue, even crueler than Pol Pot himself.278 If it
were established that Nuon Chea was only a civilian superior, he still must be held to the “knew,
or consciously disregarded the information which clearly indicated” standard.279 Based on the
available evidence, it is not difficult to prove that Nuon Chea not only knew, but could hardly
have even consciously disregarded the information available to him, as reports of what occurred
at Tuol Sleng were addressed to and handed personally to him.280
The elements that a superior-subordinate relationship must exist and that the superior had
effective control of his/her subordinates are likewise conclusively established by hard evidence,
and corroborated by the key statements of Duch, the man in charge of Tuol Sleng.281 While the
defense will likely call into question Duch’s memory and motives, there is still hard
documentation proving Nuon Chea’s link to and role in the torture and killings. Additionally,
there are surviving victims of Tuol Sleng whom the prosecution can and should call to testify.
When the hard evidence and victim, witness, and participator interviews are taken in sum,
Nuon Chea will likely be convicted for violations of IHL under all three types of the JCE theory
of liability and under direct and indirect CR as both a civilian superior and military commander.
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